Don’t make a blockage turn you into a Block Head!

If a static vent or a pitot tube blocks up you will get erroneous pressure instrument readings. From a Cessna 152 to a Boeing Dreamliner all use dynamic and static pressure inputs from nothing more than a small hole on the side of the aircraft or in the case of a pitot tube on the front of the aircraft. Guess what? Small holes block up easily and the cause can be a variety of things from ice to insects. These sort of blockages lead to incidents and sadly accidents and are as old as aviation itself. Despite these problems being very well known pilots still seem to get caught out on a regular basis, even experienced professionals are deceived by something which should be elementary knowledge to every student before first solo.

It's a great system but it relies on small holes not getting blocked up!



All the professional pilots below failed to diagnose the simplest of aviation problems and caused the unneccessary deaths of all their passengers, so remember the two maxims above, they come from the DC3 era of flying when aircraft and pilots were both basic and flew more by the seat of their pants. The irony is that todays modern computer based jet aircraft still have the capability to be flown like a basic simple aircraft so when it all goes wrong-stay cool and go back to basics and FLY THE AIRCRAFT TO A SAFE PLACE and that applies to any aircraft

1 December 1974—Northwest Airlines Flight 6231, a Boeing 727, crashed northwest of John F. Kennedy International Airport during climb en route to Buffalo Niagara International Airport because of blockage of the pitot tubes by atmospheric icing.

6 February 1996—Birgenair Flight 301 crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff due to incorrect readings from the airspeed indicator. The suspected cause is a blocked pitot tube (this was never confirmed, as the airplane wreck was not recovered).

2 October 1996—AeroPeru Flight 603 crashed because of blockage of the static ports. The static ports on the left side of the aircraft had been taped over while the aircraft was being waxed and cleaned. After the job was done, the tape was not removed.

1 June 2009—Air France Flight 447 is believed to have had a pitot tube error while in flight over the Atlantic Ocean and subsequently crashed with the loss of all aboard.

As your instructor should show you before first solo you don’t need an ASI to fly a circuit and land-understand that power plus attitude = performance. For one power setting in straight & level flight you can only be flying at two different airspeeds, why two? Well if you do not know that you had better contact me as you should not be flying if you do not understand that, it’s very important!

You cannot get performance out of an aircraft the maker didn’t build into it!

Every year pilots of all levels of experience take on the aircraft manufacturers to see if they can squeeze performance out of an aircraft that the maker never built into it in the first place.The best place to find out that you don’t have sufficient runway, is not on the runway, but in the planning stage on the ground!

Aircraft performance is always better calculated before flight than during it!

When you watch this amazing video always remember that a very hot day and a very heavy aircraft can have an enormous effect on aircraft performance. I do not know of any aircraft of any size where you can load full fuel and full payload without being over max take off weight. As they used to sarcastically say about the RAF Blackburn Beverley, ” A very useful aircraft, you could take a tank around the circuit or a bag of crisps to Germany!

These guys must be the luckiest pilots in the world.

Bet these pilots changed their trousers & checked the performance of the aircraft after they landed, pity they didn’t do it before take off. Just imagine what would have happened here if an engine had failed after V1!

Night time visual illusion kills professional pilot on finals

Captain Jon digs into the archives for another classic aircraft accident that teaches us the reality behind the theory.,

In the 1970s Captain Jon used to cut out classic aircraft accidents and paste them into a scrapbook for the flying school. Times change, no more scrapbooks needed but the accidents never go away and history teaches us that unfortunately we forget quickly and never LEARN FROM HISTORY!

Now read this very unfortunate fatal accident to a very experienced professional pilot which will help you have a greater understanding of nightime visual illusions and fatigue.


Why do we do pre take off vital actions?


Pitts S-2B Special

Leicester Airport, Leicestershire
Date of occurrence:
07 November 2010
General Aviation – Fixed Wing
The canopy had not been correctly secured before departure. As the pilot opened the throttle to take off the canopy opened and detached, striking the wing and tail as it fell to the ground. The takeoff was rejected, there were no injuries and the aircraft sustained minor damage.
Nipper T.66 RA45 Series 3, G-CBCK
Nipper T.66 RA45 Series 3
Abbots Hill Farm Strip, Hertfordshire
Date of occurrence:
10 January 2011
General Aviation – Fixed Wing
Shortly after takeoff the engine lost power and the pilot closed the throttle and landed the aircraft on a down-sloping area of uneven ground. The main fuel tank, which had been selected for takeoff, was found to be empty and the auxiliary fuel tank contained two gallons of fuel. The pilot considered that fuel had transferred from the main tank to the auxiliary tank through a defective fuel tank selector switch, but also stated that he should have visually checked the fuel tanks prior to flight.
Aircraft Type and Registration: Piper PA-28-140 Cherokee, G-BXPL
No & Type of Engines: 1 Lycoming O-320-E2A piston engine
Year of Manufacture: 1968
Date & Time (UTC): 10 December 2010 at 1520 hrs
Location: 1.5 miles south-east of Wellesbourne Mountford Airfield, Warwickshire
Type of Flight: Training
Persons on Board: Crew – 1 Passengers – None
Injuries: Crew – None Passengers – N/A
Nature of Damage: Extensive
Commander’s Licence: Student Pilot
Commander’s Age: 50 years
Commander’s Flying Experience: 12 hours (of which 12 were on type)
Last 90 days – 7 hours
Last 28 days – 1 hour
Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot
Whilst practising solo circuits, a student pilot experienced a loss in engine power. He attempted a forced landing, but the aircraft touched down at the far end of the field and collided with a boundary hedge, before coming to rest on a road.
History of the flight
The student pilot had flown a number of practice solo circuits without incident. The weather was fine, with a 10 kt breeze from the west, an air temperature of 7°C and a cloud base of 2,500 ft. During climb-out on the final circuit, the pilot noted that the engine noise changed subtly as the aircraft passed through 500 ft agl. The pilot continued the circuit, climbing to 1,000 ft agl and turning onto the crosswind leg, before levelling the aircraft and throttling back the engine. Immediately the engine lost power and the rpm dropped to 1,200. The pilot applied carburettor heat and switched fuel tanks. Although the engine responded to throttle position, the changes were small and no significant increase in power was evident. The pilot selected a field to the north-east of his position (Figure 1) and attempted a forced landing. However, the aircraft touched down at the far end of the field, hitting the boundary hedge at over 20 kt and came to rest on the road behind. The landing caused extensive damage to the aircraft and the hedge, but the pilot was uninjured and exited the aircraft without assistance through the door. Traffic using the road was brought safely to a halt without collision.
© Crown copyright 2011 24
AAIB Bulletin: 4/2011 G-BXPL EW/G2010/12/01
The flying school’s maintenance provider briefly inspected the aircraft following recovery. They confirmed that the engine controls were still connected and that there was no obvious pre-impact damage to the engine. However, no further investigation work was completed on the aircraft prior to its disposal. The pilot submitted a receipt for fuel purchased immediately prior to the flight, the quantity of which should have been sufficient for the length of the flight undertaken. He also confirmed switching the tank in use following the drop in rpm. The rescue services reported significant fuel leaks following the accident indicating that fuel was still present.
The source of the engine problem could not be confirmed given the limited examination of the aircraft.

However, the pilot reported that the engine was still running at low power and had some limited response to throttle movement. A partial restriction in either the air intake, fuel system or the carburettor could result in these symptoms. The air temperature was conducive to serious carburettor icing at any engine power. The length of the flight with normal engine response and the possible early indications during the climb-out, also support carburettor icing as a possible cause.
The UK CAA provides guidance in the form of General Aviation Safety Information Leaflets (GASIL) and Safety Sense Leaflets on the subjects of piston engine icing and forced landings. A recent AAIB investigation report (AAIB Bulletin 2/2011, G-ARHN EW/C2010/09/02) also highlights information issued by the New Zealand CAA on the subject of planning for and conducting forced l

I Know Everything About Flying!

I know everything about flying! An interesting thought provoking and admit it, annoying title isn’t it? I’ve never heard anyone come straight out and say it but I’ve certainly come across many who after you have been around them for a few painful moments you think to yourself, he really thinks he knows everything about flying!

The other thing I have noticed is that sometimes the younger the pilot and the less experienced the pilot, the more they seem to believe that they do really know it all. I’ve only been on Twitter a few weeks but I have already met two teenagers that give me the impression that they think they know everything about flying and they are not even qualified yet!

One of the main qualities you need as a pilot is the ability to be able to take advice and criticism, especially in a multi crew role. The single crew pilot has an even bigger task because he generally acts alone with no supervision and input from anyone else.

Instructing teaches you that students do the most amazing things, things you wouldn’t expect, at times you wouldn’t expect and in particular they can easily get mixed up in a high work load situation. I remember once sitting in a Cessna on base leg staring out of the side window thinking to myself what a great summers day, I wasn’t paying full attention to the student, I admit. I was thinking how peaceful and quiet it was up here until I suddenly realised why it was so quiet, the student had pulled back the mixture control instead of the throttle and we were in fact a glider-he had shut the engine down! Another incident also proved to me how confused students can get;

Peter Prior was the chairman of the cider makers HP Bulmer, a very intelligent and capable man he had been a captain in the British Army. I watched his first solo at Shobdon one lovely summers afternoon. He made an excellent approach, everything looked just right, he was at the correct height and angle, he rounded out perfectly and it looked as if it would be an excellent landing but suddenly we were all taken aback when full power was applied and he went around or overshot as we called it in those days. When I spoke to him afterwards he told me that he had been that nervous that instead of closing the throttle for the landing he had opened it by mistake so decided to carry on and fly the go around!

So you can see that students can operate the wrong controls or the right controls the wrong way, especially in a stressful situation and it’s not only students that are capable of getting it all horribly wrong. I used to fly with a first officer who was a complete pain in the arse, a know it all who didn’t seem to realise that it was a two crew operation, sometimes I used to wonder if  I was invisible! On an approach one day in the Airbus 318, with another captain, he misselected the wheelbrakes on instead of selecting the final stage of flap, the aircraft subsequently landed with all the wheel brakes set and all the mainwheel tyres and wheels were destroyed, thankfully the aircraft stayed on the runway but it was very fortunate that there was not a serious accident. The interesting point about this first officer is that he was probably one of the most intelligent pilots on the fleet and had come through to us on the Oxford graduate programme. So you see no matter how clever you are you, how accomplished you are, you can make a potentially disastrous  mistake that when analysed on the ground seems utterly ridiculous.

The Kegworth accident, when a BMI Boeing 737 landed across the M1, was another ‘wrong selection accident’ caused by both pilots misidentifying and then subsequently shutting down the good engine instead of the one that had been damaged and on fire. The aircraft eventually became nothing more than a useless glider that couldn’t reach the runway.

One of the most tragic ‘wrong selection’ aviation accidents was of that of the BA Trident Papa India at Staines in the 70s when a first officer on take off from Heathrow retracted the leading edge droops (high lift devices|) instead of the leading edge flaps causing the aircraft to immediately approach and then exceed the stalling angle which lead to an unrecoverable deep stall and total loss of control. All on board were killed after the aircraft struck the ground within a few minutes of take off.

How do you guard against making such mistakes? Cross checking or cross referencing is an important skill to develop to minimise potential error. Take your time, as my first simulator instructor said to me, Stay Cool and Stay Loose! Never just dive in with the first option without some thought, a moments thought can save a lifetime of regret,

As a single crew pilot it is even more vital that you make the right selection and take the right action because there is no one else to monitor what you are doing, you in fact have to develop an instant self checking action with every action you make. Obviously there are some incidents or events when you do need to take very quick decisive action but hopefully your training will have been comprehensive enough and recent enough to allow you to deal with those types of urgent emergencies expeditiously and correctly.

Attitude also plays a very big part. You must understand that no one is infallible and that everyone makes mistakes.‘You are never as good as you think you are’ is a good motto to have at the forefront of your mind. In my experience flying is a rare and wonderful privilege but you will never master it or beat it, there is always a final lesson waiting around the corner. Always be on your guard, the only weak link in the cockpit may be YOURSELF!

September 7th 1983 – STEVE HARISS & NICK HARPER RIP-They lived and died flying!

In memory of STEVE HARISS & NICK HARPER update September 28th 2014

On the morning of September 7th 1983 4 very  happy people departed from Birmingham(EGBB) in a Cessna 182  for Killkenny (EIKL) in Southern Ireland, two hours later they would be all be dead on Ireland’s fourth highest mountain.

Routing overhead Strumble and then directly to Kilkenny, once they crossed the Irish coast they had just one obstacle to clear, Mount Leinster which is 2409 feet high but sadly the mountain claimed another aircraft that day.

Don’t find out your local safety altitude the hard way!

At 9.15 on that fateful morning they made their last ever radio call to Shannon,

” Descending from 6000 feet to 3000 feet”

12 hours later the wreckage was found just 30 feet from the summit of the mountain with the bodies alongside.

30 years later on September 7th (I wrote this on September 7th 2013) as I write this I still feel that horrible emotion of wretched sadness and the same grief when the mortuary attendant pulled back the sheets and I said, ” Yes that’s Nick” and “yes that’s Steve”. In that 28 years I have watched my own son grow up and I am now able to fully realise the pain that those two families must have felt over the loss of both of their boys.

On the evening of September 7th Nick’s father phoned me in tears saying ” Why have I just read the paper to find out my son has been killed in an aircraft accident”? Unfortunately the flying school at Wellesbourne, from where the aircraft had been hired, had released the names of the pilots before the families were informed.

Nick & Steve were buried together in the nearby church at Elmdon, the village that Birmingham airport originally took its name from in 1939, on their graves it simply says, They Lived and Died Flying.

Nick & Steve most certainly lived for flying, Nick was my receptionist and right hand man at The Warwickshire Aero Club  were I worked part time as CFI. I had just finished Steve’s instructor rating course and both of them were looking forward to joining me at my new flying school at Wellesbourne which we opened a few months later and I could not have wished for two finer people to work with.

For Steve’s 21st Birthday his mother had bought him a flight with me through the air charter and executive jet company I was the chief pilot of at the time on an Aztec from Birmingham to Le Touquet. I had done a lot of training with Steve, both his IMC rating and his instructor course and he was pretty sharp, in fact they both were and both were destined to become very competent professional pilots. Both pilots certainly shone out as stars at the flying school (which was fatally troubled by a bitter feud between the two directors).

On the day we went to Le Touquet I was impressed when Steve immediately challenged me on why I hadn’t set the regional QNH when I left Birmingham CTZ,  he didn’t miss a trick, its funny but that’s the only thing I can now remember about that day out that saw us having lunch together in the French town.

This accident happened to the last pair of pilots I would have ever expected it to have happened to, they were careful, competent and well trained.

I have never really been able to fully understand the accident, although the full facts are probably only known by a few people as this was not an ordinary ‘club flight’.  I, in fact had no knowledge of the flight at all until I was told of the accident as the boys had booked the aircraft through a flying school at Wellesbourne. I do need to mention these facts though because there is a valuable lesson to be drawn from this awful tragedy.

The rear seat passengers, who were unknown to Steve and Nick, approached the company I flew for via a travel agent enquiring about chartering an aircraft to Kilkenny on September 7th, after being given a price they never accepted the flight. The assistant in that travel agent was learning to fly at the Warwickshire Aero Club and was instantly dismissed on the day of the accident, I will leave you to draw your own conclusions.

Both of the boys had been flying together and building up hours, Nick to do his instructor rating and Steve to build up hours towards a CPL. They had been to a variety of destinations and I can remember having a complaint from the receptionist at Cardiff airport about their manner at the desk one day which I thought was very funny because as far as I was concerned they could do no wrong and promptly told her so and put the phone down! Having known this receptionist I am very sure in fact it was her that was very rude and Nick didn’t take shit from anyone!

This flight was different however, they had entered the world of professional flying through the back door, this time they had to get to destination, turning back or diverting was not the first option that would have been on their minds. Immediately we can see an error chain developing here, the pressure of loosing safe options coupled with inexperience. The next part of the chain could have been in the planning. My good friend Cliff Bradley, now a captain on the 787 with Norwegian Air, tells me that Steve approached him on the evening of the 6th, the day before the accident, at his flying school, Executive Air, to buy a chart for  Ireland as understandably he had not got one. I feel this may have contributed to the error chain in some way as this cannot have given them the ideal adequate time for planning and familiarizing themselves with the route and the topography of Southern Ireland which per square mile has many more hills and mountains than England. The next part of the chain would have undoubtedly have been the aircraft, as far as I am aware Nick had only once flown the Cessna 182 before and Steve not at all, this type of flight would not be the best introduction to this aircraft especially in IMC to a strange destination.

The weather could have been the next stumbling block and I suspect if Steve and Nick had been flying on their own they may have had second thoughts after looking at the forecast for Southern Ireland.

The final part of the error chain may have been the final descent in IMC. The aircraft was seen in and out of cloud by locals before it hit the mountain. No one will ever know what exactly happened in the cockpit that morning but these two pilots would have not flown in an area of high ground at that altitude if they had all the facts they had needed. There could of course had been an engine malfunction or even carburetor icing, we will never know for certain. They could also have had a mis set altimeter. The original full Irish air accident investigation file has gone missing  so if anyone has an original I would love to see it again! It should always be remembered that if you are flying IMC over high ground or unsuitable ground to land a light aircraft upon you should consider driftdown if you have an engine failure. Just like being over a city, you should be able to GLIDE CLEAR in the event of an engine failure in IMC!

They could have also made a navigational error. Perhaps they thought they were further west as after the mountain its a clear run to Kilkenny, although their statement that they were descending to 3000 feet seems to point to them being full aware of the mountain ahead. To be completely safe though they should have only descended to 3500 feet. (note 2000 feet minimum clearance is recommended with high ground over 3000 feet)

Maybe they had relied on the Strumble VOR for tracking and not appreciated the errors that exist at increased range, whatever the reason its clear they were trying to break cloud and to continue VMC to destination. Let it be a lesson to us all in that you definitely need to know exactly were you are before you make the transition from IFR to VFR flight at or below safety altitude and that you should always consider driftdown in the event of an engine malfunction.

My recommendations are:

Never get involved in a flight that pushes you past, or to the limit, of your experience.

When flying to an area or country you are not familiar with you need to be extremely careful with topography, spend time building up a visual picture of the high ground, especially around the airfield.

Take advice from others with more experience of the area or type of flight you are about to embark upon

Always know the 25nm 10nm & 5 nm safe altitudes for every airfield you fly into, by know I mean have it written down. Information you cannot access is useless!

When calculating safety  altitudes above hills and mountains you always need to add another 300 feet for uncharted obstacles as they are not shown unless above 300 feet agl.

Never descend below safety altitude unless you can use two independent means of verifying your position.

Always consider DRIFTDOWN in the event of an engine failure or power loss, you must be able to glide clear of the high ground.

Beware of the limitations of all navigational aids especially range & accuracy considerations

Never try to fly into an airfield using a procedure that is outside your experience level.

You cannot park up in an aircraft and re plan things but you can HOLD anywhere and buy some thinking time, so make sure you know how to enter an en route and destination hold if you fly in IMC.

Always consider a diversion option and make that diversion if you feel uncomfortable about continuing the flight to destination.

The accident site (Info from Google)

Forest Edge (819 474) to Blackstairs Mountain (811 448)
From the forest edge, climb on to the spur at 811 468 and continue uphill over rocky ground to reach Blackstairs Mountain, marked by a small cairn hidden among peat hags. A short distance to the east there is a small iron cross marking the site of a plane crash in 1983 in which 4 people died. It was this accident that prompted the setting up of the South Eastern Mountain Rescue Association. (The coordinates given are OSI)

First Solo Pilots fails to recover from landing bounce

AAIB Bulletin No: 11/2002 Ref: EW/G2002/09/03 Category: 1.3
Aircraft Type and Registration: Piper PA-28-180 Cherokee, G-OIBO
No & Type of Engines: 1 Lycoming O-360-A4A piston engine
Year of Manufacture: 1966
Date & Time (UTC): 2 September 2002 at 1715 hrs
Location: Wellesbourne Mountford Airport
Type of Flight: Training
Persons on Board: Crew – 1 Passengers –
Injuries: Crew – None Passengers – N/A
Nature of Damage: Bent propeller tips
Commander’s Licence: Student Pilot
Commander’s Age: 32 years
Commander’s Flying Experience: 13 hours (all on type)
Last 90 days 9 hours Last 28 days 5 hours

The student pilot was undertaking his first solo flight in good weather conditions with a very light wind. After a normal approach the aircraft bounced on touchdown. The pilot kept the power at idle and eased the nose of the aircraft down in an effort to recover. However, this resulted in the propeller striking the runway on the subsequent landing, damaging the propeller tips. The pilot taxied the aircraft back to the parking area before shutting down. The student pilot had been taught the appropriate bounce recovery technique during his training.


More Folk Lore-The pre-landing check!

Pre -Landing Checks Downwind

Downwind checks, just what should they be and how long. Our school has a very long list which contains things the aircraft does not have such as undercarriage etc..

Roger Thane,Student, Formby — taken from a pilots forum!!

Thanks Roger we all had a laugh reading the posts! Forums love this type of question and the range of answers vary from amazing to ridiculous!

BUMPFHHC I think were the ones in question.

First I should say never call pre-landing checks downwind checks otherwise when you join crosswind or final you may miss them out.

For our money the least amount of checks you do in the circuit the better because the circuit is one of the few places that so many aircraft operate together within close proximity of each other, so you want to be eyes outside as much as possible.

The most important pre-landing check is to make sure you do not bump into anyone else!

The one check however that is vital on each downwind leg in the circuit is a check for carburettor icing and you must leave the heat on for a minimum of 15 seconds.

Our check is


Carb air full hot

Brakes off

Undercarriage down (OK we havn’t got a retractable but it keeps the pneumonic going and gives people something to argue about on forums!)

Mixture full rich 

Fuel correct tank/sufficient (minimum landing fuel = 45 mins for students)

Carb air full cold

The above check takes around 15 seconds but we do each CHECK then--LOOKOUTCHECK slowly

While doing checks keep an ear on the radio and and eye on the circuit!


Ts and Ps–When selecting full power always very quickly glance to see that we have full take off power and combine it with a quick Ts and Ps check. When we level out we aways do a quick Ts and Ps check. So that means we do not have to do this downwind its already been done.

Some schools/clubs add even more to it–you need to do what the school teaches you but when you get your licence do what needs doing and look at the manufacturers flight manual or handling notes for guidance as well as applying some non-forum common sense.

They Say A Good Landing Starts From A Good Approach – Does it?

A good landing starts from a good approach, we have all that heard that one before! Actually a good landing starts a long time before that, most likely back in the clubhouse. It’s the attitude and knowledge that you walk to the aircraft with that will decide what sort of pilot you will be and that can also help with your landings.

Most instructors will tell you that you need an aircraft to teach landings but I won’t!  An aircraft is the worst classroom in the world, if you were designing a classroom would you make it look like a training aircraft cabin, I don’t think so and thats before we even propel it through the air at 100 mph with you hanging onto the controls? A lot of the pain could be taken out of landing training if much more time was spent in the classroom talking about theory, stalling, slow flight etc… Spending time looking at videos and pictures of landing aircraft. Using model aircraft to simulate the stages of the approach and landing. So much can be done in the classroom, so many questions can be asked and its so much easier to check for understanding in the classroom rather than in the confines of  a cockpit at 100 feet.

Of course aircraft only earn money when they are in the air and instructors and student pilots naturally want to fly, not be stuck in a classroom so this opportunity is not always explored in the way that would be most beneifical to the student.

Captain Jons Training Tips

Understand what happens at the approach to the stall in regard to lift and drag especially on the approach, landing and go-around.

Understand the unique qualities and presence of induced drag.

Look at a nosewheel assembly and a mainwheel assembly, understand the mechanics and the limitaions.

Ensure you understand the function of the nosewheel assembly.

Classic Bad Stalling Advice

If one of your wings dip sharply during a stall, use opposite rudder
to correct. Using aileron only can aggravate the situation.

I spotted this advice on the internet the other night from an American flying instructor. It’s always disappointing to see this type of advice given by a flying instructor as an instructor should be able to explain any part of the syllabus with unambiguous plain language, lets see how we can improve that and why.

If a wing drops at the stall or the aircraft yaws this is likely to produce further yaw and wing drop. The problem with correcting wing drop with aileron (which is the natural reaction) is that the outboard section of the wing may already be stalled so any further increase in angle of attack (caused by aileron deflection) may cause a deeper stall at the tips. This snowball effect, left uncorrected, may build up to an incipient spin and it may be likely that the aircraft will enter a fully developed autorotative state, commonly known as spinning, if corrective action is not taken immediately. However aircraft designers were well aware of the problem and have used devices or designs to reduce the chances of tip stalling.

WASHOUT –  If you look at the trailing edge of the Cessna 150/152/172/182 etc series you will see that the there is a change of incidence towards the tip and this includes the ailerons. This change of incidence means that when the wing root stalls the wing tip with the ailerons may remain unstalled and hence the ailerons will function normally.

LEADING EDGE SPOILERS – If you look at the leading edge of the Grumman AA1 and AA5 you wil see a small strip of metal on the wing root leading edge. In normal flight and low Aof A this has no effect but at highs A of As it produces turbulence over the wing which will cause the roots to stall before the tips. Interestingly this type of spoiler can be bought as a retro fit kit for Cessna high wing models.

LEADING EDGE SLATS-If you look at the Rally Club or Commodore you will see leading edge slats which spring out automatically at high angles of attack(they are fully extended on the ground) smoothing the airflow over the wing and reducing the possibility of one wing stalling before the other.


Adverse aileron yaw is an OUT OF TURN YAW and its presence at the stall can leading the aircraft to drop a wing unexpectedly in the opposite direction. Two methods have been used by designers to prevent adverse aileron yaw

The Frise aileron is pivoted at about its 25 to 30% chord line and near its bottom surface. When the aileron is deflected up (to make its wing go down), the leading edge of the aileron dips into the airflow beneath the wing.  The down-moving aileron also adds energy to the boundary layer by the airflow from the under-side of the wing that scoops air by the edge of the aileron that follows the upper surface of the aileron and creates a lifting force on the upper surface of the aileron aiding the lift of the wing. That reduces the needed deflection angle of the aileron. If the leading edge of the aileron is sharp or bluntly rounded, that adds significant drag to that wing and help the aircraft to yaw (turn) in the desired direction, but adds some unpleasant or potentially dangerous aerodynamic vibration (flutter).


The  the up going aileron is made to deflect more than the down aileron  This also helps reduce the likelihood of  wing tip stalling. The DH Tiger Moth was one of the earliest aircraft, to use differential ailerons.

If one of your wings dip sharply during a stall, use opposite rudder
to correct. Using aileron only can aggravate the situation.

So going back to te original statement this is how I would have written it

If one of your wings drops shaply at or around the point of aerodynamic stall use opposite rudder TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER YAW- DO NOT PICK UP THE WING WITH RUDDER.

So stop any further wing drop by using rudder (and this needs practice) recover in the banked attitude and when the wing is unstalled and you have flying speed THEN level the wings. Aileron may well not aggravate the situation and most certainly in some configurations in a slow decelerative stall( standard weights, c of g, loading) in the high wing Cessna aircraft you can pick up the wing at the stall no problem at all-BUT ITS A BAD HABIT TO GET INTO because some aircraft will bite you very hard if you use aileron at the point of stall!

Happy flying!